Parties and politicians want their messages to generate media coverage and thereby reach voters. In this research project, we study whether and how party campaign messages are taken up by the media: which party actors are most successful in getting their messages into newspapers? What kinds of issues are most interesting to journalists and editors? And which newspapers are most likely to report on what party's messages?
‘Partisan bias in message selection: media gatekeeping of party press releases’ (forthcoming in Political Communication)
‘Who gets into the papers? Media attention to party communication in election campaigns’ (forthcoming in British Journal of Political Science)
‘Fighting for attention: Media coverage of negative campaign messages’ (forthcoming in Party Politics)
The left-right dimension is widely used by voters and parties as a ‘super-issue’ with flexible, varying meaning. In this research, we argue that policy positions on this 'super-issue' are related to 1) positions on sub-dimensions such as the economy and cultural issues and 2) the emphasis that political actors devote to these sub-dimensions.
We argue that this affects how parties can shift their policy positions and how voters perceive party policy positions on the left-right scale. In addition to policy change on individual issues, parties and candidates can change their overall position by increasing their emphasis on certain opinions within an issue dimension. Moreover, we analyze the extent to which party policy positions on each subdimension influence party placements on the left-right dimension, and whether the importance of each subdimension depends on the salience of that subdimension to a party, voters, and the party system in general.
‘It sounds like they’re moving: understanding and modelling emphasis-based policy change’ (with Markus Wagner, forthcoming in Political Science Research and Methods)
‘How voters map party policy positions on the left-right scale’ (with Markus Wagner, under review)
‘Changing voter perceptions of party positions’ (with Heiko Giebler & Markus Wagner)
Coalition governments are vulnerable to problems resulting from diverging interests of the cabinet parties, threats, and external shocks that may lead to premature government termination. To cope with these challenges, they typically employ mechanisms of mutual control.
In this research project, we study whether and how government parties combine mechanisms of mutual control to make coalition governance work. Moreover, we study the potential consequences of the architecture of coalition governance for a government's performance.
'The Architecture of Coalition Governance' (with Alejandro Ecker & Wolfgang C. Müller)
'How and why coalition governance matters for cabinet survival' (with Alejandro Ecker & Wolfgang C. Müller)